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Message: <br /><br /> If you are having trouble reading this email, you may view this article online at: http://www.jweekly.com/18178/full/18178/israeli-author-in-s-f-offers-new-insight-into-six-day-war/ <br /><br /> <b>Israeli author in S.F. offers new insight into Six-Day War</b> <br /> Friday, July 26, 2002 | by <p>ALEXANDRA J. WALLBulletin Staff </p> <br /><br /><p>Nevertheless, when he was doing the research for "Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East," Oren uncovered a wealth of new material, he said during a recent visit to San Francisco.<br /><br /> Much of this information went into his book. As a result, on nearly every page, "there's a revelation, [of] something that made me go 'oh my God.' Writing it was so fascinating and went so fast, that I hardly remember writing it at all."<br /><br /> Oren, the American-born former director of Israel's Department of Interreligious Affairs under the late Yitzhak Rabin, is currently a senior fellow at Jerusalem's Shalem Center. He is married to Sally Edelstein, a San Francisco native, whose sister, Joan Devanny, was killed by a suicide bomber in Israel in 1995.<br /><br /> According to Oren, one cannot understand the complexities of the modern Middle East without fully understanding the ramifications of the Six-Day War.<br /><br /> His book is exhaustive in its research and relies on sources not used in prior books. Because the United States, Great Britain and the United Nations all share the same policy on declassifying documents after 30 years—and he puts some of this information in print—much of it will come as a revelation to readers. The Russian archives also go by this rule, noted Oren, except that "they are a mess." And while there are no such archives in terms of the Arab world, there are ways to get information.<br /><br /> "In the Arab world, there is very limited access officially. But unofficially, through all sorts of back channels, you can pay for documents. I employed Arab researchers who cannot be acknowledged. They gained access to all sorts of documents, like an internal book from the Jordanian army, which lists every move and why they moved it."<br /><br /> There is a reason this war—when Israel fought off a coordinated attack from Jordan, Syria and Egypt and not only won, but captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan and Gaza and Sinai from Egypt—looms so large in both Jewish and Arab history. To Israel, it proved the military might of a country that had been perceived as the underdog. And to Arabs, it became known as "the setback."<br /><br /> The Six-Day War changed many things, said Oren, listing the first as the end of Arab nationalism and Nasserism (referring to President Gamal Abdul Nasser) in Egypt. This "opened the door to the ascendancy of Islamic ideology, which has had a huge impact on everybody, including the United States."<br /><br /> Secondly, said Oren, there was no Israeli-Palestinian conflict before 1967. Israel was at war with Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The postwar period also saw the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a dominant presence in Arab politics.<br /><br /> Thirdly, up until the Six-Day War, Israel was supplied with arms from France. Israel's victory changed that.<br /><br /> "That was the first time the Americans recognized that Israel was a democracy, and thought 'maybe we should have them on our side,'" said Oren. And that was the start of the United States-Israel alliance.<br /><br /> And last but not least, said Oren, is Israel's acquiring the "disputed territories," as he called them.<br /><br /> Myths about the Six-Day War abound, said Oren, and they are not exclusive to one side.<br /><br /> All the rhetoric on the Arab side, calling for Israel's destruction, left some doubt whether there was actually a plan to do so. According to Oren's research, there was a serious plan to destroy Israel, but for a number of reasons it wasn't implemented.<br /><br /> Each country had a different reason, he said. For example, the Egyptians planned to cut Israel in half, as well as bomb all its strategic sites. But Israeli intelligence discovered the plot in time and was able to prevent it. In the case of Syria, the officers of a unit never showed up, causing Oren to crack, "they threw a war and nobody came."<br /><br /> On the Israeli side, there was a myth that a sense of unity existed in Israel before the war. That was not the case, he said. "They were bitterly divided."<br /><br /> This continued into the war, when there was major disagreement over whether to capture East Jerusalem.<br /><br /> "Most religious people were afraid of liberating Jerusalem. They were afraid of the Catholic Church and thought it would come down hard on Israel for taking it."<br /><br /> Much of Israel's victory had nothing to do with planning and can be attributed to just dumb luck, said Oren.<br /><br /> During the campaign in the Sinai, for example, the Egyptians went into a "massive retreat," he said.<br /><br /> Giving another example, he said the United States pressured the Arab League to accept a cease-fire, but since the league only met once a week, the process dragged on.<br /><br /> "All of these things had far-reaching ramifications for the region and the world," said Oren. "It teaches us a lot about international relations."</p> <p> </p>

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