Those urging U.S. intervention in Syria may be driven by humanitarian intentions, to end the fighting and ease suffering. But whatever they propose — no-fly zones, safe havens, direct supply of weapons to rebels — have they seriously evaluated three highly visible, recent precedents?
Afghanistan: There is no question that after September 11, 2001, the United States had to invade Afghanistan, destroy al-Qaida’s infrastructure there, and overthrow its Taliban partner. Yet today, 12 years later, U.S. troops are still in Afghanistan. The delusion of rebuilding that country has failed. About 2,200 Americans have died, many of them killed by Afghan “allies.” The Taliban is still strong.
Iraq: Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, about 4,500 American soldiers have been killed. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent. Whether or not the war was worthwhile can still be debated. The Iraqis have gained the most of the three cases cited here but it is still estimated that about 200,000 Iraqis have died, mainly in sectarian fighting, which continues today although at a lower level. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein unleashed a Sunni-Shiite war of terrorism that could be dwarfed by what might happen in Syria.
Libya: In this case, U.S. involvement was indirect and caused no American casualties. While the overthrow of dictator Moammar Gadhafi would have been a boon to U.S. strategic interests in earlier years, by the time it actually happened, Gadhafi was relatively neutralized. Being governed by an elected regime may be counted as a gain for Libyans but anarchy, rule by militia, and extremism is still strong.
This is a complex picture. Three dictatorships have been overthrown and three elected governments replaced them. How to measure the change?
U.S. strategic gains? It is true that the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein — two of America’s most active enemies — was a clear gain. But having said that, it is not clear that these three governments contribute much to real U.S. interests.
Libya is a client state yet its main usefulness has been to funnel arms and money to opposition Islamist groups in Syria. Iraq is not helpful on two priority U.S. interests, Iran and Syria. Afghanistan is still angry at the United States and continues to be a playground for Pakistani intrigues with anti-American Islamists. Plus Pakistan obtained billions of dollars in U.S. aid while giving safe haven to the very al-Qaida leaders that the money was paid to have them help catch.
Now come demands for an escalated U.S. intervention in Syria, as if there is nothing to learn from these precedents. Yes, the advocates of involvement usually don’t seek direct military action. And they are justifiably appalled at the death of 70,000 people, a number certain to rise.
But what are the arguments on the other side?
Does the United States want to fight to install a radical Islamist regime in Syria that is certain to be anti-American?
How will Americans feel if their aid and weapons are used in the future to murder Alawites and Christians, to invade the Kurdish autonomous area, to suppress
moderate Sunni Muslims. The weapons could also be passed on to terrorists in other countries and used to shoot down civilian airliners.
Do Americans really expect gratitude or strategic cooperation from revolutionary Islamists for their help in winning the civil war?
Is the United States then going to give billions of dollars to rebuild Syria’s economy for an Islamist regime?
Does the United States have the necessary influence and leverage to force allies of the al-Qaida affliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, to abandon it? No. The United States already tried and failed miserably.
There is much talk about “moderate fighters,” but how many such people actually exist? Ironically, most are defectors from Assad’s army, who don’t have such a pro-democratic record. But the main drawback is that they are very weak and disorganized. Talk of setting up a zone under their control is absurd. In fact, the latest trend is the massive defection of soldiers from the “moderate” Free Syrian Army — the great hope of U.S. policy — to al-Qaida!
Don’t get me wrong. On balance, I’d like to see the Assad regime fall. From a strategic standpoint, though, the fact that the Sunni and Shiite Islamists are battling in Syria may not be the worst thing in the world — they both want to destroy U.S. interests and wipe Israel off the map.
Remember that the United States covertly intervened in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War on the side of Iraq, for reasons that could well be justified, but ended up fighting two wars against Iraq in the next 15 years.
Remember that Americans cheered the downfall of the repressive shah only to see a more repressive, far more aggressive, and far more anti-American regime replace it, not to mention the seizure of American hostages at the U.S. Embassy.
Remember also that Americans cheered the downfall of the Libyan dictator only to see a raging anarchy in which American diplomats were not taken hostage but murdered. Today, their killers walk the streets of Benghazi providing security, untouched by Libya’s government, laughing at the Americans who empowered them.
Things in the Middle East are not so simple.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.