President Barack Obama is pro-Israel, even though he does not shower Israel with love on a daily basis, as was the case during 16 years of pampering under the Clinton and Bush administrations.
In addition, the president does not mutter at every opportunity how deep America’s commitment is to Israel’s security and qualitative advantage; yet when it comes to all the parameters that count, Obama is pro-Israel.
The president stood up at Cairo University and declared that the alliance with Israel is unshakeable. Moreover, before criticizing him for his “humiliating” attitude to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, we should note that Obama maintains no warm personal ties with any foreign leader, including the French president, the British prime minister, the German chancellor, or even the Mexican president or Canadian prime minister.
Obama is also not a romantic diplomat such as Jimmy Carter or an idealistic diplomat like Bill Clinton. He is a realist whose approach to foreign policy is much more similar to that of Republicans Richard Nixon or George Bush Sr.
Obama, and the Washington officials in his camp, see U.S. interests and regional balances before them: India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq and the Gulf, and Israel and the Arab world. The aim of these balances is to produce or maintain stability.
Obama pledged to pull many of the U.S. forces out of Iraq by August, he continues the war against al Qaida and its satellites and “franchisees,” and he attempts to formulate effective policy to counter Iran’s nuclear efforts. Hence, the United States has an interest in seeing a strong Israel that would constitute part of the deterrence vis-à-vis the radical and violent bloc in the Arab-Iranian theater.
In light of the above, the criticism leveled at Israel by Gen. David Petraeus and by Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates is incisive: The absence of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, or at the very least a robust and ongoing diplomatic process, poses challenges and produces problems in promoting America’s interests in the Middle East.
If we wish to sum up the criticism, Israel is turning from an asset to a burden for the United States.
In the view of many members of the establishment in Washington, Israel is not helping the U.S., and hence is not helping itself. After all, Israel’s national interest is to maintain the alliance and special relationship with the U.S. This is Israel’s greatest strategic asset and most amazing diplomatic achievement throughout its 62 years of independence.
To a large extent, the U.S. commitment to Israel is incommensurate with its regional interests; nonetheless, the relationship has developed into what it is. Hence, Israel has an interest in a strong United States, because a powerful United States and a stable special relationship imply a strong Israel, clearly boosting Israel’s power and deterrence.
The price required of Israel is not genuinely high and does not undermine its vital interests. Beyond the dourness and cool reception accorded to Netanyahu by Obama, we should note that the administration’s demands of Israel are not new and do not constitute a radical change in policy; rather, they constitute a repetition — which is certainly more incisive and unequivocal — of demands presented by previous administrations.
Those who claim this is a policy change absolve themselves of responsibility for failing to comprehend the Obama administration. Everything, and this includes everything, had been said in the weeks that passed between Obama’s swearing-in ceremony and the general elections in Israel early in 2009.
Netanyahu’s survival in power, preservation of the current coalition, and ongoing construction in the settlements located outside the three large blocs and east of the security fence are legitimate interests for Netanyahu himself, yet it would be difficult to characterize them as vital interests for the State of Israel; it’s even more difficult to convince us that these interests justify a rift with the United States.
There is no need to resort to doomsday scenarios in respect to Israel’s ties with the United States; such scenarios are unlikely to materialize. It’s enough that the Arab world and Europeans were watching Netanyahu’s visit to Washington and that Israel’s isolation will grow.
There is no point in constantly analyzing the “implications of the crisis,” as millions of words have been devoted to the topic by now. There is also no point in again criticizing Netanyahu about the year that has been wasted without an Israeli initiative and about the tainted relationship.
The same is true for stating that this is an especially volatile conflict, as it combines fundamental gaps between Israel and the U.S. as mutual mistrust. This statement does not constitute an answer for the following question: What do we do next?
At the end of the day, two strategic Israeli interests are overwhelming here: firstly, preserving the alliance with the U.S. while undertaking adjustments that would reflect an understanding of U.S. interests; secondly, a diplomatic process vis-à-vis the Palestinians, regardless of whether it is painted in hawkish or dovish colors.
This is the agenda and that’s the president in power — and he’s pro-Israel in his “realist” approach.
Alon Pinkas was Israel’s consul general in New York from 2000 to 2004 and now lives in Tel Aviv. He wrote this piece for Ynetnews.com.