jerusalem | Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is determined not to be sidelined by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s go-it-alone approach.
As Olmert tried to convince President Bush last week of the need for unilateral action, Abbas urged the Hamas-led Palestinian government to accept a package that would enable the Palestinians to break out of diplomatic isolation and emerge as full-fledged negotiating partners with a say in Olmert’s pullback plans.
The vehicle Abbas hopes to use to regain international legitimacy is an agreement hammered out between Palestinian prisoners from Hamas, being held by Israel, and his own Fatah organization, calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The agreement is based on the Saudi-initiated peace plan of 2002, which received widespread international support at the time.
Abbas gave Hamas 10 days to accept the package.
If not, he says he will go to the Palestinian people and ask them to approve the agreement in a referendum within six weeks. Should the Palestinians accept the covenant, analysts believe there could be strong pressure on Israel to engage in peace talks on the basis of the Saudi plan. In this way, they say, Abbas hopes to re-establish the Palestinians as players and undercut Olmert’s unilateralism.
But it won’t be easy.
Hamas leaders have already rejected the plan and question Abbas’ constitutional right to call a referendum. Moreover, without Hamas’ compliance, Abbas may not have the power to secure a nationwide ballot, even though polls indicate that most Palestinians seem to want one.
The Saudi plan is based on a “land for peace” formula. It stipulates that if Israel withdraws from all territory gained in the 1967 Six-Day War, all the Arab states will normalize their relations with Israel. Hamas, however, continues to reject anything that implies recognition of the Jewish state.
Abbas has evolved several strategies to overcome Hamas intransigence. One is the planned referendum. Another is the establishment of a national-unity Hamas-Fatah government in which he, as the senior Fatah representative, would be empowered to conduct negotiations with Israel, not only as the president, but in the name of the government as a whole.
Then there is the ultimate weapon: Abbas could dissolve the Hamas-dominated parliament and call for new elections.
If he manages to get the Palestinian people and polity to commit to the Saudi plan, Abbas will create a major dilemma for the international community.
But Olmert is not just skeptical about Abbas. He also has deep reservations about the Saudi plan, which calls for withdrawal to the 1967 lines, without Israel retaining any of the large settlement blocs he wants to keep.
The prime minister hopes to keep the Saudi plan off the international agenda. He plans visits to Egypt and Europe in the coming weeks to persuade key players that Abbas cannot be relied on to deliver, and that Israel’s unilateralism is the only game in town.
Olmert, however, may not get everything he wants. If Abbas is able to get the Palestinians to accept the Saudi initiative, Olmert could find himself under pressure to make a serious negotiating effort, despite the skepticism about its efficacy.
The key to whether the Saudi plan becomes a serious option — even if adopted by the Palestinians — lies in Washington. The American goal remains a negotiated two-state solution based on Bush’s vision that he outlined in June 2002.
In his Washington meeting with Olmert last week, Bush made it clear that the United States was in no hurry to see unilateral Israeli moves, and wanted to give negotiations another chance. But Bush also assured Olmert that as soon as it became apparent that negotiations are going nowhere, Washington would back Olmert’s unilateral alternative, as long as it does not contradict Bush’s vision of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state.
Bush said that the United States will not recognize the borders Israel pulls back to unilaterally as permanent.
It is here where some analysts believe the Saudi plan could come in: not as a means of pre-empting Israel’s “realignment,” but as a way of taking things further once it is achieved.