Gaza gambit: It''s called tactics, Sharon-style

He's done it again. Ariel Sharon has once again proved his brilliance as a tactician by outplaying everyone in the game of tactics called Middle East and Israeli politics. This time around, he has even, in a benign way, trumped the Bush administration and the United States. 

What appears to be, on the surface, one of the greatest blunders of the Israeli prime minister's career — and what was indeed a risky maneuver — will instead turn out to be one of his greatest personal victories.

I am, indeed, referring to the resounding defeat Sharon suffered in the Sunday, May 2, referendum on Gaza disengagement. And I am calling it a success.

Despite the trampling the Israeli prime minister received by the members of Likud, his own political party, a defeat unparalleled in Israeli political history, Sharon is actually now in a better position vis-à-vis Israelis than he was before the vote. And although it may sound counterintuitive, Sharon is now better politically situated, and therefore in a stronger position, in terms of his relationship and negotiations with the Bush administration.

Over the years, in his military and his political life, Sharon has stood out as a master in the art of tactics — of achieving short-term goals. He has never, however, been particularly impressive in the art of strategy — of long-range planning.

Sharon's moves continue to baffle analysts and politicians and diplomats. That's because they are simply not looking at his tactics, but instead searching to find his strategy. And strategy, for Sharon, is just not an issue. 

The referendum on the future of Gaza is another glaring example.

Here's how it happened. He moved to the center.

In declaring publicly that he intended to have Israeli citizens and troops withdraw unilaterally from Gaza, Sharon once again cemented his place in centrist Israel, much as he has done in all of his negotiations with the Palestinians. Abandoning the extreme right, his natural constituency, in order to take the stand to disengage from Gaza made him more popular with the center left than even any center-left candidate on the horizon today. Sharon is now even more certain to emerge successful even if his position as prime minister is challenged in the Knesset and certainly in the next national election.

Sharon's tactics are always predicated on further ensuring his strength with the middle, the largest voting bloc in Israel. In today's Israel, there is no alternative candidate on the left to mount a challenge. The far left is just too far out and unpredictable; the center left is too involved with internal squabbling to present a face the public can rely on or trust. They would and could never gain national support in an election, even from diehard party followers.

By choosing to publicly support — even more, by initiating —what would typically be a tactic reserved politicians who are left of center, Sharon has further prevented any of the potential left-wing Labor candidates from mounting a viable campaign in a national race.

But even more impressive than his outmaneuvering of local contenders is how Sharon has now achieved a stronger position vis-à-vis the U.S. administration. Call it what you will — outmaneuvering, manipulation — Sharon did what he does best and, tactically, at least, is now in a position to call the shots.

How did that come about? I'll tell you how.

The plan that Sharon put forth, the plan that failed to gain party support, took three months of shuttling back and forth between Jerusalem and Washington to hammer out. Many of the elements put forth were compromises insisted on by the Bush administration, compromises that made Sharon uncomfortable but that he nevertheless included. They were issues connected to security and control as well as to retaliation. They were primarily the entry and exit and continued role of the Israeli army in Gaza.

Sharon did as he said he would, as the Americans asked him to, and he failed big time. It's an "I told you so" scenario that allows this Israeli prime minister a much more powerful negotiation chip than he previously had. He need not say, "My party will never swallow this" or "I cannot sell this." He can now say, simply but unequivocally, "The party has rejected it" and all will know it to be true. And then he can reshape the disengagement from Gaza the way he wants and thinks will best provide for his citizens and military and serve it back to the U.S. administration.

And when he does that, it will succeed probably. 

The way is now clear for Sharon to proceed in a manner that will placate the United States as he makes an independent, painful, but necessary move for Israel. And, all the while, he will pave the way for his political future. It's called tactics, Sharon-style.




Micah D. Halpern is a columnist and a social and political commentator. He is the author of "What You Need To Know About: Terror."